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Abstract
Threats of Chemical, Biological, Nuclear, Radiological, or High Yield Explosive
(CBRNE) events in the United States have caused the implementation of improved
preparedness initiatives. This paper focuses on biological readiness initiatives, and
compares two methodologies; one already fielded called BioWatch and another
developing project, called “A Hot Idea.”

BioWatch, a biosurveillance methodology operating since June 2003, collects air
samples in 31 cities across the United States on filter paper that is analyzed for the
presence of harmful biological agents. The time from biological release until emergency
response actions are initiated is expected to be 27-36 hours.

“A Hot Idea” uses the body’s immune response to identify the presence of
harmful biological agents. An increase in temperature is the body’s response to
inoculation with a foreign agent. Detecting a temperature increase, using infrared
thermographers, in a statistically significant portion of population would allow earlier
identification of a biological release and thereby accelerate initiation of response actions.
A selected population including policemen, firemen, and postal carriers, will be
monitored for elevations in temperature above previously developed individual
temperature profiles. These “monitors” have traceable routes to identify clustering of
temperature elevations and allow delineation of the geographic area of exposure.

The two methodologies were compared using a Benefit-Cost analysis. Benefit
was defined as the “costs averted” minus the cost to provide surveillance, and was based
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upon the reduction in mortality expected with each methodology. Advantages and
disadvantages of each system, and areas needing better delineation were discussed.
Significant challenges were identified with each methodology.
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BIOSURVEILLANCE METHODOLOGIES

Chapter 1 - Introduction
From historic times through present day, biological agents have had dramatic
impacts on the human race. The Peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. involved an epidemic
which killed thousands of Athenians and was attributed to poisoning of the water wells
by the forces of Sparta (Warner, 1972). In 190 B.C., Hannibal, the leader of the
Carthagian Army, used biology to his advantage by placing poisonous snakes inside clay
pots that were launched onto enemy vessels where the pots broke and released their
unwanted contents (Christopher, 1997). In 1346, Mongolian forces catapulted plague
infested cadavers over the fortress walls of Kaffa, the city they were attacking. The
virulent bacteria was successful in finding new hosts inside Kaffa and, as a port town,
plague-infested rats soon spread the bacteria to other ports throughout Europe. Pandemic
outbreaks of plague followed and the term “Black Death” is commonly used to describe
the events. Taking the lives of over 1/3 of the population of Europe, the Black Death is
estimated to have killed 25 million people (Jackson, 2003). The Black Death had
significant impact on the development of medieval Europe and resulted in the period of
time referred to as the “Dark Ages.”

More recently, the Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918 took more than 20 million
lives (Gensheimer, 2003). The virulence of the agent was great: it took a similar number
of lives as WWI but in 1/5th the time (van Hartesveldt, 1992). Both today and in the
future, biological agents affect our everyday lives. Natural and malicious use of

microorganisms is inevitable. Obvious agents in our generation include Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), West Nile Virus, seasonal influenza, avian influenza,
and the coronavirus that causes Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). New
agents are emerging each year. Our country’s preparedness needs to be evaluated and
improved to minimize the effects of the next major biological event when it occurs.

The United States government currently performs biosurveillance every day with
a biodefense initiative called BioWatch. An early-warning surveillance system,
BioWatch is designed to detect a release of a harmful biological agent in major cities
across the United States. The implementation of the BioWatch system is a step forward;
it improves readiness posture against harmful biological agents. However, there are
shortfalls to the program. Rarely is a panacea identified providing comprehensive
solutions to all aspects of a complex problem and BioWatch is no different.

This thesis will explore an alternative solution to BioWatch, focusing on one in
particular, that harnesses the human body’s immune system as its warning signal. This
alternative involves regularly scheduled thermal infrared scanning of a portion of society.
Core temperatures would be tracked and a pre-determined variation will signal as a
possible exposure to a harmful biological agent. This alternative technology is referred to
as “A Hot Idea” and is credited to Dr. Robert Armstrong of the Center for Technology
and National Security Policy at the National Defense University and Dr. Stephen Prior of
the National Security Health Policy Center at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.
The complete name of Drs. Armstrong’s and Prior’s methodology is “Rapid Detection of
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Exposure to Potentially Harmful Materials” but hereafter will simply be referred to as “A
Hot Idea.” This thesis presents a comprehensive comparison between the two biological
agent surveillance alternatives. A benefit-cost model was developed to compare the two
technologies from an economic standpoint. Additionally, thorough discussion of
intangible factors not represented in the model and other alternative biological
surveillance strategies is undertaken.

BioWatch Background
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of
2002 (more commonly referred to as the “Bioterrorism Act”) was passed as Public Law
107-188 on 12 June 2002 to improve the country’s bioterrorist readiness. Since that time,
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has funded over $2.7 billion for
public health preparedness efforts through grants administered by the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and just over $1 billion for hospital preparedness grants
administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (Schuler, 2004).
Table 1 shows the major public health information technology initiatives undertaken to
address concerns that generated the Bioterrorism Act. BioWatch is a subset of the
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Biological Warning and Incident
Characterization System.

Table 1- Major Federal Public Health Information Initiatives in Response to the
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 (http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/).
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During the 2003 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush
announced that the federal government was "deploying the nation's first early warning
network of sensors to detect biological attack." (Bush, State of the Union Address, 2003).
He was referring to BioWatch.

Although overseen and funded by DHS, many organizations implement
BioWatch. In coordination with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the CDC
and their members of the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), BioWatch provides
early-warning surveillance for pathogenic agents at various cities around the country.
The LRN is network of certified laboratories created to improve the nation’s public
health laboratory infrastructure in both capability and capacity (CDC website, 2005).
BioWatch is designed to detect and confirm the presence of biological agents within 36
hours of a release as shown in Table 2.

Table 2 - BioWatch Detection and Confirmation Timeline (Emory, 2005)
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The sampling collection details are performed by the EPA. These duties are wellsuited to the EPA as the BioWatch air samplers are similar to, and sometimes co-located
with the agency’s air quality monitors. The analysis component of the program is
overseen by the CDC. The actual analysis is performed by members of the LRN.
Finally, in the case of a positive identification of a harmful biological agent, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I) has lead jurisdiction (Shea, 2003).

Specific details regarding the schedule of sample collection and analysis, the
particular agents analyzed for, and the location of detectors is understandably guarded for
security reasons. Sources report that BioWatch was unveiled in June 2003 and involves
approximately five hundred air samplers in thirty-one cities that continuously collect air
samples that are retrieved every twelve hours and analyzed for harmful biological agents
(Kosal, 2003) 1 . An analyst from the Congressional Research Service in the Library of
Congress, Dana Shea, suggests, “The system tests for the pathogens that cause anthrax,
smallpox, plague, and tularemia but the entire list of pathogens is not publicly available”

1

Sources report this collection time to vary between 12 and 24 hours depending upon the perceived threat
and location. Table 1.1 is taken from the Emory’s Inspector General report and states the maximum
collection time to be 24 hours.
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(Shea, 2003). Government officials have indicated that the number of agents tested for
is less than a dozen (Prior, 2004). Although the exact number of agents tested for is
unknown, the number is certainly finite. It is likely that the six Category A agents
identified by the CDC are tested for: anthrax, smallpox, tularemia, botulinum toxin,
plague and agents that responsible for viral hemorrhagic fevers (CDC website, 2005).
Definitions for the categories created by the CDC are described in Table 3 below.
Table 3 - Biological agents as categorized by the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC website, 2005)

CATEGORY
A

B
C

DEFINITION
Easily disseminated or transmitted from
person to person, cause high mortality
rates, and have the potential to disrupt
both public health and social life
Moderate in ease of dissemination and
morbidity with a low mortality rate.
Potential for high morbidity and
mortality rates and can cause major
health impact

EXAMPLE
Anthrax, Smallpox,
Tularemia, Plague,
Botulinum Toxin
Cryptosporidium,
West Nile virus
Rabies, Influenza

Regarding specific cities participating in the program, Shea reports Philadelphia,
New York City, Washington, DC, San Diego, Boston, Chicago, San Francisco, St. Louis,
Houston, and Los Angeles are all members of the surveillance effort (Shea, 2003).

Thermal Scanning Background
The cornerstone of “A Hot Idea” is to recognize a signal, namely an elevation in
body temperature, after the human body is introduced to a foreign biological agent. The
human body and its immune system sample the environment with every breath of air.
Triggers to the immune system are automatic with the introduction of a foreign biological
agent. Sneezing and coughing initially attempt to physically remove the foreign agent. If
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needed, antibodies are produced and core temperatures are elevated as the body’s
metabolic rate is increased to assist in the removal of the foreign agent. It is the body’s
response of increasing the metabolic rate and consequently elevating the body’s
temperature that is key to “A Hot Idea.” The response time and degree of temperature
elevation vary depending upon the concentration and type of infectious agent the immune
system is dealing with, but generally speaking, an increase will occur before an
individual knows their body has been attacked by a biological agent. Working with the
workforce of a particular city, individual temperature profiles would be developed and
monitored. This workforce represents a group of "mobile samplers.” As an example, the
Washington D.C. workforce handling emergency response and postal duties consists of
approximately 23,500 personnel (Armstrong, 2004). Police comprise the majority of this
workforce with 12,110 personnel. The rest of the workforce includes 150 parking
enforcement workers, 4,900 firefighters, 5,940 mail carriers and 400 emergency medical
service workers (Armstrong, 2004). This workforce has a traceable daily route. The
workers’ core temperatures will be collected pre- and post- work shifts. If one member’s
core temperature varies significantly from a baseline temperature that has been
established specifically for that individual, that person will be notified that he or she may
be acquiring an illness – but work will continue as usual. But, for example, if a
predetermined statistically significant portion of individuals report temperatures
abnormally above their specific temperature profiles, data management software will
notify personnel of this anomaly. Further investigation would be undertaken to
determine the areas visited that day by the affected personnel and identify the source
causing the elevation in temperature.

7

One quick, non-invasive method of measuring body temperature utilizes an
infrared thermal scan. This approach was applied in airports in Singapore, Tokyo, Hong
Kong, and Canada during the SARS epidemic of 2003 (Shea, 2003). In Canada, 763,082
arriving and departing people were scanned by thermal scanners sensing body
temperatures greater than 38°C (St. John, 2005). A Beijing report states that 30 million
people were scanned for elevated temperatures during a 6 month period; 9,292 of these
people were pulled aside to further investigate if personnel suffered from SARS. Of
these personnel, 38 were suspected SARS and 21 were confirmed SARS cases (Wu,
2004). “A Hot Idea” will subject a segment of a city's workforce to similar infrared
thermal scans looking for clusters of workers with elevated temperatures. These clusters
would then undergo additional medical screening to identify the source of increased
temperature.

Identifying the cause of the elevation in temperature will elucidate the responsible
agent. This will be true whether the agent is a Category A agent, an emerging infectious
disease not yet identified, or a simple seasonal influenza virus. BioWatch, on the other
hand, will only notify personnel of the presence of a harmful agent if it is selectively
screened for. Dr. Stephen Prior, the Director for the National Security Health Policy
Center of The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, suggests the number of agents
screened for is somewhere between 6 and 12 agents (Prior, 2004).
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The sensor used in “A Hot Idea” is uniquely selective to agents that will affect the
human body. This is true because the sensor is the human body. Essentially, false
positive results are eliminated: anything that causes a response in the mobile sensor, or
the workforce, will cause a similar response in the human body because they are one and
the same. Conversely, it could be argued that there is value in notification of, for
example, a botched anthrax release. If all the spores released in a bioterrorism event
were too large to affect the human body (effectively removed by coughing and sneezing),
there is still value in knowing there was an unsuccessful bioterrorist event. “A Hot Idea”
wouldn’t alert officials of this unsuccessful malicious release of biological agents, while
the BioWatch analysis might.

By attempting to identify the causative agents of disease, “A Hot Idea” will
identify both intentional releases of biological warfare agents and natural outbreaks of
disease. For example, the onset of the seasonal influenza or an emerging unknown
infectious disease may be identified. Both will most likely be natural outbreaks evading
detection of the BioWatch system. Advantages to positively identifying the onset of
seasonal influenza include implementing final public health readiness issues, checking
the viability of the current year’s vaccine, and commencement of educational and public
awareness initiatives. Advantages to positively identifying possible pandemic strains of
influenza, such as avian influenza (“H5N1”) are many and discussed in an upcoming
section.
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The location of samplers deserves consideration for “A Hot Idea” and BioWatch.
Optimal placement of sampling equipment must be determined with the fixed BioWatch
samplers. The changing environmental conditions and the sometimes-strange interaction
between high-rise buildings and winds present challenges to finding the optimal location
to sample. The workers of “A Hot Idea” on the other hand, travel traceable routes
including exposure to both indoor and outdoor environments. The workers thereby cover
a greater geographical area than a number of stationary samplers. If a cluster of workers
shows abnormally high core temperatures, an investigation could be undertaken
identifying the similar locations visited by those affected. Conversely, in areas with large
crowd densities such as stadium events and heads of states gatherings, stationary
samplers could be brought in sample the atmosphere individuals are exposed to. In this
scenario, both methodologies might be considered for implementation

Methodology
BioWatch and “A Hot Idea” are compared and contrasted against each other and
against the idea of a “do-nothing” approach. This research determines a benefit – cost
relationship between two different detection methodologies. Aspects other than
economic are also considered. The principal goal listed on the Department of Homeland
Security’s agenda is to “Increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic
events” (DHS website, 2005). This research evaluated each detection system and a “donothing” option in terms of that goal. The accuracy of each detection method is
evaluated by reviewing data collected from past BioWatch data, the SARS preparedness
initiatives of 2003, and analysis of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States.
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Thermal screening data from manufacturers of thermal scanning units is used.
Additionally, non-market factors not quantified with economic figures (such as
acceptance of technology) is evaluated and incorporated into the analysis. Limitations of
the both methodologies are discussed. Areas such as the data management and the
pathophysiology of increasing body temperature are covered. Further discussion of these
items clarifies a “proof-of-concept.” Finally, considerations of a new emerging
infectious agent, such as avian influenza, and the morbidity impacts are mentioned.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
The 2005 National Institute of Health (NIH) budget for biodefense spending was
$1.7 billion (Enserink, 2005). Since the anthrax attacks of 2001, annual funding for
biodefense research has increased dramatically. “An Open Letter to Elias Zerhouni”
published in the 4 March 2005 issue of Science challenged whether NIH was distributing
these research dollars prudently. Zerhouni is the head of the nation’s medical research
institution, the National Institutes of Health (NIH). The letter was signed by 750 U.S.
microbiologists – including the president elect of the American Society of Microbiology
(ASM) and seven past ASM presidents (Enserink, 2005). Since 2001, there has been a
1500% increase in funding grants for the NIH’s National Institute for Allergy and
Infectious Diseases (NIAID) research exploring anthrax, plague, tularemia, glanders,
meliodosis, and brucellosis (Altman, 2005). In that same time, grants to study nonbiodefense–related agents have decreased by 41% (Altman, 2005).

Consider Table 4

comparing the average number of cases of different diseases seen per year in the United
States.
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Table 4 - Average Number of U.S. Cases per year from 1996 – 2003
by Disease Type (Altman, 2005).

Biological Agent

Biological Agent

Tularemia

Average U.S.
cases/yr
122

Tuberculosis

Average U.S.
cases/yr
17,403

Anthrax

3*

Salmonellosis

42,457

Plague

5

Shigellosis

23,567

Glanders

0

Syphilis

38,007

Melioidosis

0

Gonorrhea

346,765

Brucellosis

103

Chlamydia

685,508

* includes 22 bioterrorism- related events in 2001.
Many microbiologists, considering the financial distribution of research dollars
and the prevalence of disease between biodefense- and non-biodefense agents, believe
this is extremely one-sided. These microbiologists believe the threat is not from the
classic category A agents but from emerging infectious diseases. Dr. Robert Armstrong,
Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Center for Technology and
National Security Policy, reports that between 1973 and 2003, an average of one new
disease emerged annually. Some of the more memorable diseases include Legionnaires’
disease in 1977, HIV/AIDS in 1981, West Nile Virus in 1999, and SARS in 2003
(Armstrong, 2004). Avian influenza, commonly referred to as bird flu, could be the next
on this list.

Many microbiologists believe a combination of four factors makes influenza
potentially the most dangerous of all known viruses: it crosses the species barrier readily;
it can be very virulent, killing a high proportion of those infected; it is highly contagious;
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and it can genetically recombine quickly into more dangerous strains (Financial Times,
2005). It is this ability to recombine quickly that is of concern with the H5N1 avian
strain of influenza that has emerged in the Far East.

In its current form, the avian influenza virus does not present a great threat to
humans because it is not readily transmissible between humans. When humans do
contract the disease though, fatality numbers are high: the World Health Organization’s
February 2006 report counts 93 deaths among 173 cases for a 53% mortality rate (WHO
website, 2006). However, if a human were to contract both H5N1 influenza and seasonal
influenza, the viruses could genetically combine into a form with the virulence of H5N1
and the human-to-human transmission characteristics of seasonal influenza. In this
scenario, morbidity and mortality rates would soar as a contagious and virulent virus is
spread world-wide. The word to describe this situation is “pandemic”; it comes from the
Greek words for “all” and “people”’: “pan” and “demos”. Pandemic differs from the
word “epidemic.” In Greek, “epi” means “upon”. Epidemic is an outbreak upon a
certain location, community or region. If the location or region is the entire world then
the world-wide epidemic could be called a pandemic.

The CDC describes pandemic influenza occurring when “a new influenza A virus
appears or “emerges” in the human population, causes serious illness in people, and then
spreads easily from person to person world-wide (CDC website, 2006). The CDC
describes localized seasonal outbreaks, or epidemics, of influenza as seasonal influenza.
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Three influenza pandemics have occurred in the last century. The worst of these
was the 1918 pandemic which killed at least 20 million people (Gensheimer, 2003).
Today a new avian influenza is presenting itself in the Far East: the H5N1 influenza
virus. This paper uses the terms “avian influenza” and “H5N1” interchangeably; a
separate disease is seasonal influenza and should not be confused the former terms.
Experts theorize that the new avian influenza virus has the potential to spread around the
globe and become the next pandemic of influenza. The estimated economic impact
within the U.S. for the next influenza pandemic has been estimated as high as $166.5B
USD (Balicer, 2005). The expected mortality toll in the United States is estimated to be
89,000 to 207,000, with hospitalization numbers expected to be 314,000 to 714,000 and
outpatient visits numbering between 18 million and 42 million (Gensheimer, 2003).

Should We Care?
Numbers above show the possible effects of such a virus. They rival or exceed
the numbers that would result in the case of a biological warfare attack. As a biological
agent, influenza is considered a Category C agent by CDC (see Table 3). Considering the
expected effects of pandemic influenza, is the H5N1 virus categorized correctly? To
further identify the possible severity of a pandemic avian influenza Gensheimer created
Table 5 showing the similarities and differences between a bioterrorist event and a
pandemic avian influenza.
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Table 5 - Comparison between a Bioterrorist Event and
Pandemic Influenza (Gensheimer, 2003)
Planning for pandemic influenza and bioterrorism: similarities and differencesa,b
Issue
Likelihood
Warning
Occurrence
Transmission/duration of exposure
Casualties

Bioterrorist event

Pandemic influenza

High
None to days
Focal or multifocal
Point source; limited;
person-to-person
Hundreds to thousands

High
Days to months
Nationwide
Person-to-person, 6–8 wks

First responders susceptible?
Yes
Disaster medical team support/response
Yes
Main site for preparedness, response, recovery,
State and local areas
and mitigation
Essential preparedness components
Yes
Surveillance
Law enforcement intelligence
Yes
Investigation
Yes
Research
Yes
Liability programs
Yes
Communication systems
Yes
Medical triage and treatment plans
Yes
Vaccine supply issues
Yes (for most likely threats)
Drug supply issues
Yes
Training/tabletop exercises
Yes
Maintenance of essential community services
Yes
Essential response components
Rapid deployment teams
Yes
Effective communications/media relations
Yes
strategy
Vaccine delivery
Yes (for some)
Drug delivery
Yes (for most)
Hospital/public health coordination
Yes
Global assistance
Possibly
Medical care
Yes
Mental health support
Yes
Mortuary services
Yes
Supplies and equipment
Yes
Essential mitigation components
Enhanced surveillance
Yes
Enhanced law enforcement intelligence
Yes
Vaccine stockpile
Yes (selected agents)
Drug stockpile
Yes
Pre-event vaccination
Vaccination of selected
groupsc

a

Hundreds of thousands to
millions
Yes
No (too widespread)
State and local areas

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Prototype vaccines only
Yes
Vaccination of groups at
medical
high risk with pneumococcal
vaccined

During a catastrophic infectious disease event, such as an influenza pandemic, there may be critical
shortages of vaccines and drugs. Thus, clinics set up to administer vaccines and distribute antimicrobial
drugs may require the services of a range of personnel whose fields of expertise are nonclinical. Examples
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of additional personnel that may be needed include law enforcement, translators, social workers,
psychologists, and legal experts.
b
Source: Adapted from: National Vaccine Program Office. Pandemic influenza: a planning guide for state
and local officials (Draft 2.1). Atlanta: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 2000.
c
At the time of writing, the smallpox vaccination program was just beginning. For other bioterrorist agents
for which vaccines are available (e.g., anthrax), limited supplies and concerns about safety profiles have, up
to this point, effectively prevented the widespread use of these vaccines.
d
It may eventually be possible to vaccinate high-priority groups and the general population with a yet-tobe-developed “common epitope” vaccine, which might provide for a broader spectrum of protection against
a variety of influenza A subtypes.
Table citation: Gensheimer KF, Meltzer MI, Postema AS, Strikas RA. Influenza pandemic preparedness.
Emerg Infect Dis [serial online] 2003 Dec [date cited].

Table 5 shows that H5N1 should not be confused with ordinary “seasonal
influenza”. Seasonal influenza typically occurs during the winter months with some
years having higher illness (morbidity) and lethality (mortality) rates than other years.
On average, 36,000 people die per year in the United States because of seasonal influenza
(CDC website, 2006). While this number is high, the potential loss of life from a
pandemic strain of H5N1 is much greater.

To help avoid confusion between avian influenza and seasonal influenza, the
scientific and public health communities are promoting the use of the term “H5N1” by
the media when discussing the avian influenza disease. This naming convention is being
done to distinguish the “H5N1” virus from ordinary seasonal influenza and, hopefully,
increase the urgency of research and education initiatives. The CDC website explains
that influenza viruses are categorized into one of three types: Type A, B, or C. Birds are
the natural hosts to type-A influenza viruses and the H5N1 avian influenza reported in
recent media reports is of the type-A variety (CDC website, 2006). The specific
nomenclature “H5N1” denotes different proteins on the surface of the virus. The
influenza type-A virus has 10 genes which encode for 11 proteins (Zubay, 2005). The
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“H” and the “N” stand for different subtypes of two of these proteins. The “H” stands for
hemagglutinin and the “N” for neuraminidase. There are 15 different subtypes of
hemagglutinin and 9 different subtypes of neuraminidase (Lee, 2004). The subtype of
protein on the influenza virus surface determines the name of that particular virus.
Hence, the H5N1 virus has the 5th subtype of hemagglutinin and the 1st type of
neuraminidase on its surface. Both located on the influenza virus’s surface,
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase are essential to the viron’s life cycle. Hemagglutinin
allows the virus to attach to the host cell’s plasma membrane and enter into the cytoplasm
(Zubay, 2005). Neuraminidase is responsible for releasing progeny viruses from host
cells (Zubay, 2005). The two other types of influenza, type-B and type-C, are not named
according to subtype and are of lesser concern. Type-B viruses occur only in humans but
are not believed to be able to cause pandemic outbreaks (CDC website, 2005). Type-C
viruses only cause mild illness in humans and are not able to cause epidemics or
pandemics (CDC website, 2005).

Because of the potential toll that avian influenza presents to the economy and
human lives (see Table 5), the U.S. should be concerned with H5N1. Early detection of
the avian influenza virus will be one key to minimizing the impact of a pandemic.

Syndromic Surveillance and BioSense
Currently, emerging infectious diseases are often discovered when patients
present at health-care facilities, such as clinics, hospitals, or physician offices. In time,
when large numbers of patients present similar symptoms, an astute medical professional

18

will recognize the similarities and investigate the causative agent. This is often how an
emerging infectious disease is discovered. Using information technology to track similar
symptoms presenting at multiple health-care facilities and highlighting this statistical
spike is the idea behind syndromic surveillance. Tying the different health-care facilities'
data into one system and effectively monitoring data anomalies is a difficult task. The
CDC's BioSense program exists to address this need.

BioSense is under the Public Health Information Network program (see Table 1).
The Public Health Information Network is a national initiative involving multiple
organizations sharing information to identify outbreaks of disease. Colleen Bradley, a
public health analyst for the BioSense project, describes it as a CDC initiative,
implemented in April 2004, to support enhanced early detection, quantification, and
localization of possible biologic terrorism attacks and other events of public health
concern on a national level (Bradley, 2005). The focus is on earlier detection for the
local and state public health agencies. Earlier detection facilitates a more timely response
and thereby mitigates the negative effects of a biological event. Algorithms identify
statistical anomalies in Department of Defense and Department of Veterans Affairs
ambulatory clinical diagnoses, in procedural data, and in Laboratory Corporation of
America laboratory-test ordering data (Bradley, 2005). Stratifying these data by location
and time helps determine trends and clusters of disease that are emerging.
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BioWatch
The U.S. government currently uses the system “BioWatch” as the basis for the
country’s biosurveillance detection methodology. DHS is responsible for deploying this
system as part of the Biological Warning and Incident Characterization System.

BioWatch consists of an area air sampler that collects large volumes of air.
Samples must be manually collected and transported to a laboratory. Once in the
laboratory, the air samples are analyzed for the presence or absence of harmful biological
agents. Sample analysis is performed on a regular basis. The periodicity of sample
collection and analysis is not made available to the public, but it can be assumed to be
resource-intensive. While the entire cost of the BioWatch program is unknown, the
capital costs for installation in a single city are estimated at $1 million and the yearly
budget for operation at $1 million per city (Shea, 2003). Recent press reports have
quoted higher costs; the total cost of BioWatch deployed to 31 cities has been cited as
$60M (Charles, 2003). The 2005 initiative to increase the number of cities participating
in BioWatch is expected to increase the program cost to $118M (Charles, 2003).

This methodology only looks for a finite number of biological agents and will not
identify an emerging strain that has not been previously identified. Further limitations
are discussed below.

20

BioWatch Limitations
When collecting air particulates, the size distribution is governed by the filter
used to collect that sample. This results in a wide variety of particle sizes collected.
Some of these particles are of the size which the human body is susceptible to, but others
are too small or too large to be of concern to the human body. The natural defenses of
the body effectively remove them and thereby render them harmless.

BioWatch collects air samples wherever the sampling devices are positioned.
Theoretically, detectors would be placed in high-threat locations based on intelligence
and locations based on prevailing weather conditions to optimize detector interaction
with biological agent releases. In reality, weather conditions change, resulting in
suboptimal positioning of detectors. Additionally, urban environments present unique
environments with unusual air currents. Depending upon the architecture of the city,
eddy currents and dead spots may exist between buildings, further compromising the
utility of fixed detector locations.

Samples collected are then analyzed for the presence of a biological agent of
concern. The Category A agents that the CDC has published as “the most easily
disseminated or transmitted from person to person, cause high mortality rates, and have
the potential to disrupt both public health and social life” are most likely screened for
(CDC website, 2005). Undiscovered emerging infectious diseases are not analyzed.
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Continuously sampling the environment for harmful biological agents has not
previously been undertaken. The EPA has deployed air samplers across the country and
we commonly see the results of these activities in the weather section of the daily
newspaper and on local news broadcasts. Pollen count, smog indices, UV levels, and
mold counts are examples of items that are monitored daily but continuous sampling for
harmful biological agents has not been previously performed. First, the scientific
community has not identified the vast majority of organisms that exist on the planet
today. Soil ecologists commonly state that they have perhaps identified one percent of the
organisms living in topsoil; of the remaining 99 percent, most of the organisms are
bacteria (Zelicoff, 2005). A similar percentage of unidentified organisms exist in the air.
It is unknown what continuous sampling results would yield – what are the agents that
public health officials need to concern themselves with? A second and larger problem
has occurred at least three times since inception of the BioWatch program.

In the winter of 2002, analysis of BioWatch samples identified at least one
anthrax spore using polymerase chain reaction, a technique so specific that one spore of
anthrax could result in a positive identification. Should one anthrax spore be of concern
to the population of New York? Past studies show that workers not immunized in wool
mills could inhale several hundred spores daily without developing disease (Dahlgren,
1960).

The subsequent actions were problematic. A response procedure was not

developed to deal with such an incident. After analysis, no other BioWatch samplers
tested positive for anthrax. No spikes in syndromic surveillance were noted. With no
additional pieces of information, what was the appropriate action? The anthrax
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bacterium is endemic to many parts of the United States, especially where cattle farming
operations occur. A hardy spore-forming bacteria, Bacillus anthracis can remain viable
in the soil for decades. The natural background concentration of anthrax spores was
unknown and so was the appropriate response. In the end, no public notification took
place and the source of the anthrax was not determined. However, the positive anthrax
identification did cost millions of dollars and many hours of the New York Department of
Health's resources.

In October 2003, BioWatch samplers again collected an agent of concern; this
time the bacterium that causes tularemia. The city was Houston, TX. Indicative of a
malicious release, three BioWatch units aligned in the path of predominant weather all
tested positive. Tularemia is endemic to the southwestern parts of the United States and
has a reservoir of rodents and rabbits. It is sometimes referred to as “rabbit fever” and is
caused the bacterium Francisella tularensis.

The background concentration of

tularemia in Houston was unknown; distinguishing between a natural event versus a
malicious release was not possible. Similar to New York, there was no agreed upon
response plan. The Houston Department of Health increased air sampling and examined
local rodent and rabbits, considering them as a possible source. In the end, the source of
the three positive samples for tularemia remained unknown, but not before valuable time
and resources were spent investigating the incident.

Francisella tularensis was the agent of concern again in September 2005. More
than 6 BioWatch sensors picked up tularemia bacteria in the Mall area of Washington,
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D.C on 25 September 2005, but the CDC was not notified for at least 72 hours after
detection (Levine, 2005). Asked why such a delay occurred, the director for the CDC’s
Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, Richard
Besser, stated because subsequent tests were not conclusively positive (Levine, 2005).

All three of these examples are indicative of a limitation associated with the
BioWatch response time. Table 2 describes a maximum response time from release until
detection of 36 hours. These three examples show response times longer than this. The
point isn’t to dispute the use of subsequent testing to assure the validity of a detection of
harmful biological agents. Confirmational sampling is required to avoid unnecessary use
of resources and undue alarm in the public. The limitation is in reference to the benefit
provided to society. This paper quantifies benefit by the reduction in mortality due to the
surveillance in place. The reduction in mortality is heavily dependent upon the time to
initiate response actions. If actual response times are hindered due to confirmational
testing requirements, estimates of mortality numbers will not be accurate nor will the
societal benefit.

Infrared Thermal Scanning
Infrared radiation thermometry is now commonly used as a standard methodology
to measure the temperature of the human body. As a non-invasive approach, the infrared
ear thermometer is both quicker and easier to use than oral thermometers. This
technology can also be applied in a mass screening mode measuring individual body
temperatures quickly. This use was employed to combat the outbreak of SARS in 2003.
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SARS caused 813 deaths in the 8,437 cases that were reported world-wide during
6 months of 2003 (Wu, 2004). The disease, with an average mortality of 10%, is
communicable and was reported in 29 countries around the world (Wu, 2004). The
cardinal symptom of SARS is fever, but conventional means of measuring human body
temperature with oral, and even ear, thermometers were slow and cumbersome.
Attempting to control the spread of this epidemic, Singapore employed infrared
technology to screen mass numbers of people in 2003. The Singapore Ministry of Health
(MOH) consulted with their Defense Science and Technology Agency (DSTA) who used
their Sensor Systems Division (SSD) to find a solution (How Tan, 2004). Within one
week a prototype was built to measure large numbers of people quickly. The Infrared
Fever Screening System (IFSS) was released shortly thereafter.

Infrared Fever Screening System with “A Hot Idea”
The IFSS was implemented to identify individuals with fever with follow-up
investigation to determine whether febrile persons had SARS. Incorporated into “A Hot
Idea,” IFSS would be looking for an elevation in temperature. The distinction between a
fever and an elevation in temperature is an important one in understanding the basis for
“A Hot Idea.”

A fever is commonly defined as measurable sign of infection; often a body
temperature of 38°C or greater is cited as the threshold for fever. An elevation in
temperature is one of the initial mechanisms the body responds with after becoming
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inoculated with a foreign agent. The rise in temperature could be to 38°C or higher, but it
doesn’t have to be. Any increase in temperature from an individual’s baseline
temperature initiated by the immune system constitutes an elevation in temperature. An
elevation in temperature is before the onset of symptoms and signs of a fever because the
individual does not recognize it as a fever nor does the medical community determine a
fever through measurement. Further discussion follows in the report regarding the
pathophysiology of fever and the body’s mechanisms at work to elevate temperatures
from the baseline temperature.

Infrared Fever Screening System 2
IFSS uses a two-tier detection concept to screen a large group of people for fever:
the first is the detection of feverish individuals with the infrared technology; the second is
confirmation testing with conventional means, i.e. oral or ear thermometers (How Tan,
2004). The IFSS measures exposed areas around the face of screened subjects where the
blood vessels are relatively close to the surface of the skin. These areas were determined
to be areas around the temples, neck and a small patch of skin between the eyes and nose
(How Tan, 2004). Additional studies have focused on a specific location on the forehead
and the inner corner region of the eyes because these areas are not normally covered by
the subjects and have a temperature close to the body's core temperature (Ng, 2005). The
IFSS compares the infrared heat given off by a subject to the infrared heat given off by a
separate thermal reference source (TRS). Calibrated and set to a pre-determined reference

2

Discussion of IFSS uses the correct term “fever” due to IFSS use during the 2003 SARS
outbreak. When incorporated into “A Hot Idea,” IFSS would be configured to look at the earliest elevation
in temperature.
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temperature, comparisons between the TRS and the subject are made. Software converts
the differences between the TRS temperature and the subject temperature and assigns
different colors to represent different temperatures. Red often signifies elevated
temperatures above some threshold temperature (Wang, 2004). The degree of increased
temperature is indicated by the density of the red region and the amount of red surface
area on the subject. Figure 1 below shows the typical output by this type of infrared
scanner.

Figure 1 - Typical Output by Infrared Fever Screening System Type Thermal Scanner. Left
photo shows normal temperature; right photo show elevated temperature. Notice the
Thermal Reference Source in the background of both photos. (Wang, 2004)

The relationship between one’s core temperature and skin temperature varies with
the subject and the environmental conditions. Understanding and correcting for these
variables is paramount to assuring the accuracy and minimizing false positive and false
negative screening results. Human beings control their temperatures internally, although
changes in temperature may occur through the physical processes of convection,
conduction, radiation, and evaporation. Figure 2 shows the proportional amount of heat
loss through the different mechanisms.
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Figure 2 - Human Heat Loss through Various Mechanisms (How Tan, 2004)

Maintaining the body’s desired temperature is done through the endocrine system
and a specific part of the brain called the hypothalamus. The hypothalamus establishes a
target temperature for the body to maintain. For a healthy individual, a target
temperature of 37°C is considered average; however each person has his or her own
baseline temperature, usually between 36.4°C and 37.7°C (Prewitt, 2005). Excluding
illness or exercise-induced hyperthermia, a person’s body temperature varies less than
1°C during their lifetime (Prewitt, 2005). This temperature is the homeostasis
temperature. Homeostasis is a state of internal consistency in the body, or the normal
range expected in a healthy individual. Other average ranges for the body are a blood pH
in the range of 7.35 – 7.45 and a blood glucose level of 75 – 110 mg / 100mL. The body
acts through different mechanisms that are negative feedback loops to maintain the target
range. A negative feedback loop involves an effector (generally a muscle or a gland
releasing a hormone or an enzyme) whose purpose is to return the body to homeostasis.
As the body returns to homeostasis the effector is no longer triggered by the body and the
feedback loop is completed. With body temperature, variations from the average
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temperature of ~37°C are counteracted by different actions of the hypothalamus. If the
temperature is above the normal range for that body, the hypothalamus triggers the
dilation of blood vessels and the activation of sweat glands to release body heat.
Conversely, if the body temperature is too low, the body constricts blood flow to the
extremities and, if necessary, induces shivering to raise the temperature back to the
normal range. A feedback loop shown in Figure 3 describes this process.

Figure 3 - Hypothalamic Regulation of Human Body Temperature (How Tan, 2004)

Limitations of the IFSS
The thermoreceptors in the skin are more sensitive to rapid changes in
temperature than to gradual changes and therefore the subjects should be acclimatized in
a stable environment before being screened. For example, subjects should not be
screened immediately after entering a warm room from a cold environment. (How Tan,
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2004). This may present challenges to “A Hot Idea” when commissioned workforce of
policemen, firemen, and mail carriers return from cold outdoor environments after the
conclusion of work shifts.

How Tan notes that the IFSS requires subjects to be at or close to resting
metabolic rate (How Tan, 2004). Problematically, policemen, firemen, mail carriers and
others may be ending their work shifts with elevated metabolic rates due to the duties
performed that day.

The body increases temperature when the hypothalamus detects pyrogens and
raises the body’s baseline core temperature. Pyrogens are proteins that result from the
activity by the body’s immune system. They can be exogenous (derived from invading
microorganisms) or endogenous (derived by the body’s white blood cells). The
hypothalamus acts as the body’s thermostat and establishes a baseline temperature to
maintain. To initially elevate temperatures, the body constricts the flow of blood to the
surface thereby minimizing heat loss. The skin temperatures during this phase are not
elevated and would not be detected by the IFSS. This scenario increases the chance for a
false negative. The time course of a typical fever is shown in Figure 4.

The following discussion of IFSS used the correct term “fever” due to its use
during the 2003 SARS outbreak. IFSS would be incorporated into “A Hot Idea” but
would be configured to look at the earliest elevation in temperature.
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Figure 4 - Time Course of Typical Fever

Types and Limitations of Infrared Thermal Scanners
The IFSS is one type of thermal scanner (TS). Wang evaluated more than 30
thermal imaging systems. Considering the different characteristics in terms of system
set-up and working principle, Wang categorizes TS into four types.

TS Type One.
The IFSS described previously is a Type One TS. This type of thermal imaging
system is comprised of a thermal imager and an thermal reference source (TRS). The
principle of measurement is the temperature difference between the subject and the TRS,
which is set at a pre-determined threshold temperature. No quantitative temperature is
shown with a type one TS; the delta between the external TRS and the body is the value
of interest. The threshold value of the TRS depends on empirical correlation between the
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skin temperature and the body core temperature. Clinical trials collect the empirical data:
a number of people with various body temperatures undergo thermal scans, and core
temperature measurements using oral or infrared ear thermometers. The skin thermal
profiles referenced to the TRS setting are then studied. The aim of the tests is to find the
correlation between skin temperature and body core temperature and determine the
temperature of the TRS (Wang, 2004).

One limitation of the Type One TS is the variance due to environmental
conditions. The temperature stability of the subject and the TRS is of concern when the
system is not set up in an area with constant ambient conditions. The location of the
Type One TS must be in an area free from external drafts or disturbances in the air
(Wang, 2004).

TS Type Two.
A second type of TS quantitatively measures the temperature of a screened
individual; an external TRS is not used in this configuration. The thermal imager uses a
quantitative camera and assigns a temperature to the subject. A threshold isothermal
temperature is determined and an alarm signals when a person's facial skin temperature is
above this temperature. Wang describes one manufacturer's recommendation to use
multiple threshold settings. In that case, the thermal imager is set to 16 different
isothermal colors in increments of 0.5°C, thereby categorizing people into one of 16
categories based on their temperature ranges (Wang, 2004). Figure 5 below shows the
typical output by a Type Two TS.
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Figure 5 - Typical Output by Type Two Thermal Scanner. Left photo shows slight
fever of 37.7 degrees Centigrade; right photo show elevated temperature
of 38.2 degrees Centigrade. Reference temperature is 36.9 degrees
Centigrade in both photos. (Wang, 2004)

Significant drift of the detectors is a concern with the Type Two TS. Selfcorrection calibration mechanisms have been developed but the time required for these
corrections may hinder throughput of the TS process. Self-correction may also reduce
the working life of the shutter mechanism (Wang, 2004). Figure 6 below shows an
example of drift problems that are associated with Type Two TS.

Figure 6 - Typical Drift Seen with Type Two Thermal Scanner (Wang, 2004).
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TS Type Three.
The third type of TS incorporates ideas from both the Type One and Two TS; an
external TRS is used and temperature quantification is provided. Type Three TS are
configured with a TRS that has two set-points, several degrees apart (Wang, 2004). The
TRS operates under the same principle as the Type One TS. Typical output by a Type
Three TS is in Figure 7.

Figure 7 - Typical Output by Type Three Thermal Scanner. Note the two thermal reference
sources shown at the bottom of the figure (Wang, 2004).

Wang states that the Type Three TS has some problems with the initial
calibration. Operators pick a set of pixels of the TRS on their thermal cameras and assign
a temperature to them. TRS are not usually uniform in temperature and the selection of
the particular pixels makes a great difference in overall system accuracy. Additionally,
the TRS are assigned temperature values by the manufacturer. Unique environmental
conditions may influence these temperatures away from the manufacture’s specifications
and introduce measurement error. (Wang, 2004).
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TS Type Four.
The fourth type of TS incorporates a temporal thermometer to give a
measurement of core temperature. The system set-up is similar to the Type One TS,
except the temporal thermometer measures temperature in a major artery (temporal artery
on the side of the head) and thereby more accurately reflects the body's core temperature.
The system uses the same TRS as the Type One TS. The TRS is set to reflect the
threshold temperature of a fever. Measuring both subject and TRS temperatures at the
same time, software packages can determine the difference between the temperatures and
notify operating personnel of a fever. The Type Four TS also has software associated
with it allowing differentiation between human faces and other warm objects. In Figure 8
notice the system's focus on the subject's forehead instead of the subject's hot cup. Only
one of the thirty thermal scanners Wang tested was a Type Four TS.

Figure 8 - Typical Output by Type Four Thermal Scanner. Note the core temperature
reported and pixel identification focusing on the subject's forehead (Wang, 2004).
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Parameters of Thermal Scanners
Wang discusses several parameters that should be considered to ensure accuracy
and statistically significant thermal scanner results. The environment set-up, expected
volume of personnel to be screened, training of operating personnel and other factors
should be considered with the parameters discussed next to decide upon the most
optimum TS unit.

Thermal Drift.
Minimizing thermal drift should be a goal when considering type two scanners.
The drift is defined as the change of temperature during the time interval between selfcorrections (Wang, 2004). The variance from the true temperature is another way to
explain the drift.

Minimum Detectable Temperature Difference.
The Minimum Detectable Temperature Difference (MDTD) is the smallest
temperature change that a TS is able to detect by a color change or, the temperature
difference corresponding to a 5% to 95% target area color change (Wang, 2004). The
smaller the MDTD, the better the TS. Wang considered MDTD values of 0.3°C to be
good. Some systems studied by Wang had MDTD of greater than 0.6°C. To avoid the
incidence of a false negative (i.e. person with an elevated temperature passing through
the system undetected), the threshold has to be adjusted (lowered) by the MDTD. For
example, a system with a MDTD of 0.5°C and threshold temperature of 37.5°C would
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have to lower the threshold temperature by the MDTD (0.5°C) to eliminate a false
negative due to MDTD error.

Non-uniformity.
The parameter of non-uniformity concerns the temperature gradient across the
plane of surveillance. Ideally, the temperature would be isothermic and not vary across
the target plane. A small non-uniformity coefficient would offer more deployment
options. Manufacturers report non-uniformity measurements in a workable target plane
as opposed to the system’s overall target plane. The workable target plane is defined as
2/3 of the size of the target plane (Wang, 2004). Non-uniformity measurements in the
target plane would be greater than those in the workable target plane. Measurements are
taken from the center, four corners and in-between the four corners of the workable target
plane as indicated in Figure 11. Measured non-uniformity measurements ranged from
0.2°C to 2°C. A TS with a non-uniformity measurement of 2°C means the same person
could report temperatures of 38°C and 36°C dependent on whether the subject was
located in the center or corner of the workable target plane.
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Figure 9 – Thermal Scanner Test Locations for Measurement of
Non-uniformity Parameter (Wang, 2004).

Distance Effect.
This parameter involves the difference in temperature readings from a arbitrary
distance. A smaller distance effect results in more configurations and more versatile
environments the TS system can be set up in. Units with large distance effects can still
be considered for use if the units are set up in a structured environment that reduces the
distance to the TS such that a more reasonable and competitive distance effect can be
achieved.

Calibration/Stability of threshold temperature.
The threshold temperature is a reference point that the TS uses to differentiate an
elevated temperature from a average temperature (Wang, 2004). The calibration of the
reference temperature is traceable to a uniform standard, specifically the International
Temperature Scale 1990 (ITS-90). Ensuring a consistent reference point throughout the
entire operation time is paramount to accurate screenings. To determine the stability of
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this reference temperature other parameters must be considered. The non-uniformity of
the TS must be accounted for; manufacturers often measure variance from the threshold
temperature at the center of the target plane. The location of the TRS in the target plane
must also be considered for TS types Three and Four. Wang reports that the established
brands tended to demonstrate smaller errors. Type One TS are not affected by this
method of threshold setting because Type One TS thresholds are derived from clinical
trials.

Spatial resolution.
The spatial resolution depends upon the size of the detector used. Wang does not
go into great discussion with this parameter except to say that an adequate number of
pixels must be captured and analyzed by the detector. If a cold spot on the subject is
analyzed, the mean temperature of the individual could be skewed, thereby presenting the
possibility of a false negative.

All the parameters discussed have importance in facilitating a quick, efficient, and
accurate thermal scanning process. Of all the parameters discussed, Wang believes
MDTD and non-uniformity to be critical parameters (Wang, 2004). Wang analyzed more
than 30 TS and found no outright configuration that was superior to the rest. When
selecting a TS unit for the screening of a commissioned workforce as described in “A Hot
Idea”, all these parameters must be considered. If the limitations of the particular TS are
known ahead of time, the set-up configuration can be manipulated to minimize some of
these shortcomings. For example, ensuring the TRS is not in an area of changing
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environmental conditions, minimizing the distance between thermal camera and subject,
or using the central portion of the working target plane would minimize limitations of
different TS units with their respective parameters.

Economic comparison
Society has expressed an interest in biosurveillance. The post-9/11 world has
introduced both a real and perceived threat to the U.S. public. At the same time, nature
continues to create new infectious agents for which the public must be prepared. The
belief that the discovery of antibiotics would lead to a disease-free society has been
proven wrong. Kathleen Gensheimer, Maine’s State Epidemiologist and Direct of
Medical Epidemiology, and others in the scientific community, have expressed some of
the possible effects that one emerging infectious agent, H5N1 avian influenza, could have
on the U.S. society. Better detection and identification methods for biological agents
have been identified as a need but there are several ways to go about conducting this
surveillance.

Two such detection methodologies will be compared against a “do-nothing”
approach in this paper. The technology with greater economic value will be considered
the superior methodology. The economic analysis is discussed below. After determining
the superior methodology, there is an optimal amount of spending that can be invested
before there is loss on investment. To arrive at objective conclusions to these questions,
economic tools are used. Three types of analyses could be used to evaluate different
approaches: Benefit-Cost, Cost-Effectiveness, and Cost-Utility studies.
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Different Economic Approaches
The Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) is described as the “gold standard” by many
applied economists (Meltzer, 2001). All costs and benefits are measured with economic
terms and are adjusted to a net present value for future years. Simply stated, if the net
present value of the benefits outweighs the net present value of the costs, that strategy is
said to have an overall positive net present value. This analysis approach is particularly
useful when comparing two different options; the one with the larger net present value is
considered the superior option.

Both the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) and the Cost-Utility Analysis (CUA)
analyses consider the benefits in terms other than monetary units. The CEA might
deliver an output in particular units of a health outcome (e.g. lives saved) (Meltzer,
2001). The CUA incorporates a value for the quality of life ranging between 0 and 1.
For example, an individual that loses a leg is considered to have a lower quality of life
than an individual that has partial use of a leg, which is still less than a person with two
healthy legs. Neither the CEA nor the CUA deliver an output in strict economic terms.
Additionally, the CUA is better suited for chronic conditions. To arrive at an objective
evaluation with economic terms on a societal basis for acute illnesses, the Benefit-Cost
analysis was chosen for this study.

BioWatch costs an estimated $1M to deploy to a city and an additional $1 million
dollars annually for operations and maintenance (Emory, 2005). Alternatively, the costs

41

Canada incurred for operating thermal scanning units in 2003 are reported at $66,667 per
unit annually for rental costs (The Vancouver Sun, 2003). Personnel, and operation and
maintenance, costs were reported at $700,000 per unit annually (The Vancouver Sun,
2003). In the simplest form, if both of the detection methodologies had the same
accuracy and early-detection timetables for all biological agents, the methodology with
the lower capital and amortized costs would provide a greater net benefit to society than
the methodology with the higher capital and amortized costs. The methodology with the
greater net benefit to society would then have to be compared with a “do-nothing”
approach. If the surveillance costs exceed the “costs avoided”, the “do-nothing”
approach would be warranted. Alternatively, if the averted costs exceed the surveillance
costs, biosurveillance would be warranted. Additionally, since BioWatch is currently
operating in 31 cities across the county, sunk costs must be considered. Comparing the
two methodologies will depend on whether BioWatch has been previously deployed to
the geographic area of interest. Anthrax is one agent that both methodologies would
likely have comparable early-detection times and accuracy.

If, however, an emerging-infectious disease not screened for under standard
sampling and analysis BioWatch protocols is considered, a more rigorous analysis is
required. Market-based economic terms can predict objective overall benefits. Simply
stated, market-based value is a price range for which the market will buy or sell a service
or good. For example, there is a market-based value for a professor: universities have
demonstrated a willingness to pay some amount of money for the services of a professor
with certain qualifications and, at the same time, professors have agreed to provide those
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services for this same range of salary. Similarly, there are market based values for all
goods, services, and individuals’ time including: visits to medical facilities, prescription
and non-prescription drugs and days missed from work. Additionally, there are market
based values for an individual’s life considering a range of values an individual is
expected to experience in their lifetime.

The perspective of the costs associated with the analysis must also be considered.
From the perspective of an individual, the benefit of having early notification of an
infectious outbreak is the costs saved due to a decreased risk of contracting the disease.
The benefit realized by the individual can be estimated as the diminished chance of
contracting illness which would have resulted in costs associated with lost time from
work, travel associated with visits to a physician, and co-payments. The benefit realized
by the health insurance provider would include the cost avoidance from a visit to the
physician, but would not consider savings associated with the patient’s travel time saved
or their social engagements kept. Conversely, the health insurance company could
realize a negative-benefit due to early notification of the presence of H5N1: “worriedwell” patients may present en masse to health care facilities requiring reimbursement
from the insurance company. Different again, pharmaceutical companies may realize a
profit from early notification due to a large demand for pre-treatment drugs. Or would
the profit losses associated with a smaller illness rate result in less overall pharmaceutical
products being prescribed? Meltzer discusses this issue and concludes that policy
makers often contend with the perspective issue. In the end, they often focus on the
benefit from a total society perspective. “Adding up all the costs and benefits
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irrespective of who pays and who benefits … societal perspective is the most
comprehensive one; all others are subsets of the societal perspective (Meltzer, 2001).”
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
Economic Impact Considerations
The economic impact attributed to the release of a biological agent should be
quantified to develop sound prevention measures. The impact of a bioterrorist attack
depends on many factors. Characteristics of the agent, the delivery method, the
population exposed and the response reaction by both emergency responders and society
as a whole all influence the magnitude of an event involving the release of a biological
agent.

The number of people exposed and the virulence of the agent are two important
criteria to consider. Virulence is attributed to the specific agent; Bacillus anthracis
possesses a different virulence than Francisella tularensis. The virulence is also affected
by the atmospheric conditions and size distribution of the agent. For example, to
efficiently enter the lungs, anthrax spores must be between 1 μm and 5 μm in diameter
(Reshetin, 2003). If the spores are smaller than this diameter, they will be inhaled and
then immediately exhaled without being deposited in the alveolar region of the lungs.
Spores greater than 5 μm will be trapped in the nose hairs and mucous linings of the nose
and throat; they will be expelled without lodging in the lungs and causing disease.
Additionally, the spore size distribution may be between 1 μm and 5 μm but the spores
may agglomerate together and settle out of the atmosphere faster than a “weaponized”
version of the agent. The Journal of the American Medical Association described the
Hart Senate anthrax powder of 2001 as “weapons grade” and “exceptional” in that it had
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a high spore concentration, uniform particle size, low electrostatic charge, and had been
treated to reduce clumping (Matsumoto, 2003).

The method used to distribute the agent will also influence the effects of a
biological release. Distribution characteristics concern both the mechanism used to
deliver the agent (e.g. subway release, aerial sprayer, introduction into a ventilation
system, etc.) and the environmental conditions (e.g. wind speed, temperature inversion,
disinfecting ultraviolet light intensity, etc.).

Characteristics of the population also influence the magnitude of the event. The
population’s immunity to the disease is one important consideration. The time between
exposure and receiving medical attention, to include pre-exposure prophylaxis, is also
important. Kaufmann states this is the single most important factor influencing the
economic impact of biological agent release (Kaufmann, 1997). The amount of
“worried-well” in the population using limited medical resources (including limited
facility space, medical manpower, equipment, and pharmaceuticals) will influence the
magnitude of the event.

Wein Model
All of the characteristics discussed above are dwarfed when considering
variations in the size of the release. Lawrence Wein from Stanford's Graduate School of
Business, David Craft from Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Operations Research
Center, and Edward Kaplan from Yale's Department of Epidemiology and Public Health
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produced a model to predict the outcome of a 1 kg release of anthrax concentrated at 1
trillion spores per gram in a city of 10 million inhabitants. For comparison, New York
City has a population of 8.1 million inhabitants and a metropolitan population of 18.6
million (City Population website, 2005). Other cities with metropolitan populations close
to 10 million are Los Angeles and Chicago with 12.8 and 9.3 million inhabitants,
respectively (City Population website, 2005). The study uses a system of models to
address different facets of an attack. An atmospheric dispersion model, an age dependent
dose-response model, a disease progression model and a model simulating the volume
expected at medical facilities specifically for antibiotic distribution and hospital care
were all used to generate an output quantifying the impact of an anthrax release. A
graphical depiction of Wein’s system is presented in Figure 10 below.

Figure 10 - Graphical Depiction of the System of Models Used to Quantify the Impact of an
Anthrax Release (Wein, 2003).
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The atmospheric dispersion model used by Wein is a Gaussian plume model
identical to the one used in the paper titled The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979
(Meselson, 1994).

Sverdlovsk Anthrax Incident
The anthrax incident in the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics town of
Sverdlovsk is the most deadly anthrax epidemic known in modern times; at least 68
people died (Wampler, 2001). The incident and size of release remain controversial
today. The Soviet Union claimed a natural outbreak of anthrax and subsequent ingestion
of anthrax contaminated meat as the responsible cause for the cluster of deaths in 1979.
The United States, on the other hand, believed the Soviet Union was in violation of the
1972 biological weapons convention. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) asked
Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson to examine the evidence and determine release
characteristics (Wampler, 2001). In the end, Meselson reported that the outbreak was a
result of a daytime aerosol release from a military facility on Monday 2 April 1979
(Meselson, 1994). The weight of the spores released was reported “as little as a few
milligrams or as much as nearly a gram” (Meselson, 1994). This is the same base model
that Wein uses to predict outcomes of a 1kg anthrax release in a large city. It should be
noted that Meselson’s model output was contested by U.S. biological weapons experts;
they believed his estimate to be low. Thirty-year biological weapons researcher, Dr.
William C. Patrick, an expert on anthrax dispersal, stated he and other experts “hooted”
when Meselson presented his low estimate (Miller, 2002). Dr. Ken Alibek, the former
deputy director of the Soviet biological warfare operation Biopreparat, now working for
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U.S. intelligence sources, backed the U.S. position stating that the Sverdlovsk military
facility was one of the Soviet Unions busiest production plants for anthrax production,
“working around the clock, in three shifts” (Miller, 2002). Alibek explained the
enormity of the Soviet program in testimony to the 106th Congress: “Hundreds of tons of
anthrax weapon formulation were stockpiled, along with dozens of tons of smallpox and
plague. The total production capacity of all of the facilities involved was many hundreds
of tons of various agents annually” (Alibek, 2000).

The aim of the Wein paper was to determine the most effective manner to
distribute antibiotics and hospital care to those showing symptoms of anthrax disease and
those who are asymptomatic (including both the "worried-well" and those who are yet to
show symptoms). Wein used a threshold parameter p that determines the fraction of all
inhabitants that receive antibiotics in a time-varying geographical ring that grows as the
fraction of inhabitants displaying symptoms exceeds p (Webb, 2003). Ideally, all
personnel will receive antibiotic prophylaxis, regardless if they are symptomatic or not.
Even in this idealized scenario, deaths are expected to be 100,000 for a city of 10 million
when response is undertaken at 48 hours after release of anthrax (Wein, 2003).
Conversely, if antibiotic treatment is withheld until personnel are symptomatic, deaths
are expected to be 7 fold higher, or around 700,000 (Wein, 2003).

Value of Statistical Life
Using these mortality numbers, the value of lives lost can be calculated.
Numerous studies have been conducted determining an accurate value to put on human
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life, specifically for purposes of evaluating public policy decisions. Executive Orders
12044, 12291, and 12866 by Presidents Carter, Reagan and Clinton have all mandated
economic impact analyses of all significant Federal Regulations (Viscusi, 2003).
Initially, values were arrived at considering factors such as lost work hours and medical
costs. This approach was used to review the benefit of implementing Occupational
Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Hazard Communication regulation in 1982.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) rejected the regulation on the basis of
costs exceeded the benefits. OSHA disagreed with this; thinking that the benefit (the
value of a human life) was too sacred to put a value on, and appealed to then VicePresident Bush. Harvard Law School professor, W. Kip Viscusi, was consulted to settle
the disagreement between the two agencies. Viscusi used a different approach to
determine the value of life: the Value of Statistical Life (VSL) methodology. Using this
methodology, the value of life is increased by approximately an order of magnitude.
With a new value, the Hazard Communication regulation was passed (Viscusi, 2003).
Subsequent economic analyses have continued to use the VSL methodology.

The actual value of the VSL was determined by taking the mean of 26 different
economic studies; the EPA arrived at a VSL of $6.3 million dollars per person adjusted to
the year 2000 (Viscusi, 2003).

Other VSLs are used by different organizations for

economic studies; however, since the EPA is responsible for the most costly Federal rulemaking in the U.S. government, the EPA number is used in this study (Viscusi, 2003).
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Using the EPA VSL of $6.3 million and Wein’s model’s estimate of between
100,000 and 700,000 deaths (depending upon antibiotic supply and distribution) from an
anthrax attack with a response initiated at 48 hours after release, the societal economic
cost would be between $6.30 x 1011 and $4.41 x 1012 (or $630B and $4.41T). This is the
cost associated with the expected mortalities due to a release of 1 kg of anthrax
concentrated at 1 trillion spores per gram in a city of 10 million people with no
biosurveillance measures in place.

BioWatch Benefit – Cost
The societal benefit of surveillance, specifically BioWatch, is difficult to
establish. First, the cost of establishing surveillance has to be determined. No specific
quotes have been published, but estimates have been made. Shea reports that the initial
investment for a city is approximately a $1M dollar capital cost, with an additionally
$1M per year required for operation and maintenance costs (Shea, 2003). This is a
conservative figure; higher costs have been estimated. Probably the most accurate
figures come from communication with Dr. Jeff Stiefel, Program Manager for BioWatch
with the Department of Homeland Security. Stiefel stated that Fiscal Year (FY) 2003
funds allocated for the program were $60M; these funds were for the start-up of the
program in approximately 31 cities (Stiefel, 2005). FY 2004 and FY 2005 allocations
were $38M and $60M, respectively; these investments cover day-to-day operations
(Stiefel, 2005).
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Consider this cost of providing surveillance with the reduced number of
mortalities expected. The advertised capabilities of the BioWatch system are to detect
and confirm the presence of biological agents within 36 hours of a release (Emory, 2005).
Stiefel communicates the ability to know of an attack is within 27 – 36 hours. What
reduction in severity can be expected due to a shift from 48 hours in the model developed
by Wein to the 27 to 36 hours response expected if BioWatch is in place? Wein reports
that his model does not predict a markedly reduced number of deaths by rapid detection:
if the detection delay is reduced to 6 hours after release, 70,000 deaths can still be
expected (down for 100,000 with a 48 hour detection time) with optimal distribution of
antibiotics (Webb, 2003). Conversely, for the same “optimal pharmaceutical
distribution” scenario, a detection time of 4.8 days (115.2 hours) causes the model to
predict a doubling of the number of deaths from 100,000 to 200,000 (Wein, 2003).
Wein’s data points are plotted in Figure 11 below.

Wein Extrapolation
250000

Mortality

200000

y = 24055Ln(x) + 43747
R2 = 0.8284

150000
100000

y = 1810.3x
R2 = 0.819

50000

Blue – Wein Fit
Black – Exponential Fit
Red – Linear Fit

0
0

50

100

150

Time (hours)

Figure 11 –Dr. Lawrence Wein’s Model for t=6 hours, 48 hours, and 115.2 hours with
Logarithmic and Linear Fit Equations (Wein, 2005)
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Using these numbers, a response time that is shortened from Wein’s 48 hours to
the BioWatch advertised time of 27-36 hours would result in an expected mortality of
below 100,000 but above 70,000. Fitting an exponential curve to Wein’s datapoints,
equation (1) results:

(eq.1) y = 24055 ln (x) + 43747

Where “y” represents the mortality number expected and “x” represents the time
in hours until response activities are started.

With only three data points, the fit curve has an R2 value of 0.83. The R2 value is
a coefficient of determination and represents the proportion of the total sample variability
around the mean of “y” that is explained by the linear relationship between “y” and “x”
(McClave, 2005). R2 is sometimes referred to as a “goodness of fit”; the higher the R2
value, the better fit between the model (fitted curve) and the data. An R2 value of 0.83 is
not particularly high, however, a linear equation fit to Wein’s data points, yields equation
(2) with a very similar r2 value of 0.82. Equation (2) is given below:

(eq.2) y = 1810.3 (x)

Where “y” again represents the mortality expected and “x” represents the time in
hours until response actions are undertaken.
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Epidemic curves of disease often present in logarithmic fashion; additionally
Wein’s model assumes a log-normal incubation period. Without a significant
improvement to the goodness of fit using a linear best-fit line, the logarithmic equation is
the preferred modeled equation. Simplifying this, two of Wein’s datapoints are acting as
boundary conditions to the times of interest in this paper. Stated otherwise, Wein’s
model was run for 4 hours and 115.2 hours; the mortalities of interest in this paper are
included within this range. Therefore, picking points directly off of the Wein curve is the
easiest, most accurate, and therefore, the preferred method available.

The arithmetic mean of the BioWatch response time range is 31.5 hours. Using
this value for “x,” the expected mortality number is 86,600 deaths. The economic
severity associated with this number is $5.46 x 1011 ($546B). This is an economic
savings of $84B when compared to the $630B in economic costs predicted when having
no biosurveillance system in place.

The net returns from a biosurveillance system can be quantified by subtracting the
cost of surveillance from the savings averted in the population. Equation (3) represents
this as:

(eq.3) Net Returns = Savings from Costs Averted in Population – Cost of Surveillance
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Using the numbers above, the net returns for the BioWatch surveillance system
for the anthrax scenario described is a savings of $84B minus a negligible start-up and
operation and maintenance costs (Shea’s numbers are $1M and $1M, respectively;
Stiefel’s numbers are $1M and $2M, respectively – all of which are negligible when
subtracted from the savings of $84B). Therefore, the net savings provided by an
established and operational BioWatch system in city where 1 kg of anthrax is released
that behaves as modeled by Wein’s Gaussian plume is $84B. This analysis is contingent
upon an anthrax attack occurring within the first year of providing surveillance; this is not
the case.

The accurate statistical likelihood of an anthrax attack is difficult to determine or
locate in open source (i.e. not classified) literature. If the attack probability is 1 in a 100
(or one attack in 100 years) or 1 in a 1000 (one attack in 1000 years), the costs averted in
equation (2) would be multiplied by 0.01 or 0.001, respectively. Doing so results in a
BioWatch net return of $840M if the probability of an anthrax attack is 0.01; net returns
for a 0.001 probability event are $84M. The capital, and operation and maintenance
costs, are no longer negligible. From an economic perspective, a negative net return
occurs when the cost to provide surveillance is greater than the costs avoided by having
surveillance in place. In other words, the economic outcome is cheaper when not
providing surveillance than when providing it. Conservatively assuming New York City
has twice the average number of BioWatch units deployed results in a $2M start-up cost
and a $3M annual operation and maintenance (O&M) cost. Using these numbers,
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BioWatch system would return a negative net return after 28 years without an anthrax
attack.

“A Hot Idea” Benefit – Cost
Considering “A Hot Idea” surveillance, with the same anthrax scenario described
and the same likelihood of anthrax attack, would differ in two ways. First, initial costs of
the infrared thermal scanning units and their operation and maintenance costs are
different. Secondly, different costs would be averted due to an earlier or later notification
time than BioWatch’s 27-36 hours, thereby producing a smaller or greater mortality
number.

The rental cost of infrared thermal scanning units have been quoted at $33,333 per
unit, per year while personnel costs to perform operation and maintenance are $350,000
per unit, per year (The Vancouver Sun, 2003). These costs were from the deployment of
six thermal scanners at both the Toronto and Vancouver international airports during the
SARS outbreak of 2003.

The City of New York employs 40,710 uniformed police and 16,015 fire and
emergency medical service personnel (Keilin, 2001). Additionally there are 21,116
postmen who work in the city’s five boroughs; 9,107 of them are letter carriers (Mitchell,
2006). The total number of uniformed police, fire and emergency medical service
workers, and letter carriers is 65,832. The police department of New York City is
divided into 76 different precincts (NYC gov. website, 2005). Each precinct participating
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in “A Hot Idea” would require one thermal scanning unit. The fire department has 141
fire stations throughout the city. Each participating fire station would require one thermal
scanning unit. Finally, there are at least 131 post office facilities (Donohue, 2004) in
New York City, each participating facility requiring one thermal scanning unit. The total
number of police precincts, fire stations and postal facilities in New York is 348.

Assuming the commissioned workforce is equally distributed across the city, 50%
of the commissioned workforce works from 50 % of the commissioned workforce
buildings. Therefore, 174 thermal scanning units are required to provide surveillance to
half of the city’s workforce, or 32,916 city personnel. At $33,333 per unit, the annual
cost for equipment is $5.8M. The O&M cost for this equipment is $60.9M. Together
these figures equal $66.7M for equipment and operation and maintenance costs per year
for the city and scenario described.

Similar to the BioWatch calculation, the time to notification needs to be
determined to estimate the mortality using equation 1 above. “A Hot Idea” is based upon
the idea that an increase in body temperature will be one of the first responses at onset of
infection. With an absence of data regarding the sentinel response of the human body
after inoculation, consider the epidemiological data.

The epidemiological data for inhalational anthrax is limited and varied. The most
recent data is from the 2001 bioterrorist events in the United States. Fever, chills,
malaise, and fatigue were the initial symptoms reported in all ten cases occurring in
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October and November of 2001 (Henderson, 2002). The range between exposure and
onset of symptoms (defined as influenza-like symptoms: fever, chills, drenched sweats,
gastrointestinal complaints, headache, cough, and chest pain) for inhalational anthrax
during the bioterrorism related attacks of 2001 was from four to six days, with a median
of four days (Bartlett, 2002). This is referred to as the incubation period. Defined in the
Control of Communicable Disease Manual, “incubation period” is the time interval
between initial contact with an infectious agent and the first appearance of symptoms
associated with the infection (Chin, 2000). The validity of this 2001 data is not
questionable, however the small numbers of patients affected is concerning; there were
11 cases, and data was collected from 10 of the 11. Discounting the 2001 bioterrorism
attacks, there have been 18 reported cases of inhalational anthrax in the United States in
the last 100 years (Barlett, 2002). Data was not collected or kept for most of these
intermittent cases. The Sverdlovsk data is the only other source of epidemiological data
of humans but the 1979 Russian anthrax release is clouded with uncertainty. The median
duration between exposure and onset of symptoms for the anthrax release the Sverdlovsk,
Russian incident in 1979 was 19.5 days (Bartlett, 2002). The data set is larger for the
Russian release but its quality is suspect. Meselson reports 68 of the 79 patients with
inhalational anthrax died in the incident (Meselson, 1994). Another report says 358
people were ill with 45 dead; another recorded 48 deaths among 110 patients (Henderson,
2002). This variation in reported numbers and the lack of available and timely reports
from the former Soviet Union brings the quality of data into question. Other reliable
sources for anthrax information are the Control of Communicable Diseases Manual, by
the American Public Health Association (APHA) and the USAMRIID Blue Book, by the
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United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. These books
quote incubation periods for anthrax to be between 1 – 6 days and 1 – 7 days,
respectively (Chin, 2000 and USAMRIID, 2004). The Blue Book footnotes their
incubation period with a note: “During an outbreak of IA [inhalational anthrax] in the
Soviet Union in 1979, persons are reported to have become ill up to 6 weeks after an
aerosol release occurred. Studies performed in nonhuman primates confirm incubation
periods which can be up to 100 days” (USAMRIID, 2004).

The varying reported incubation periods make a singular choice difficult. Using
the median incubation time from the 2001 attacks is one approach. A 4 day incubation
period is greater than the 48 hours Wein used in his model which generated a mortality of
100,000. Reading the ordinate off of Wein’s curve at 96 hours gives a mortality of
172,000. Using the EPA’s VSL (value of statistical life) of $6.3M, the cost associated
with this expected mortality is $1.08T. This is $450B more than the fatalities expected
from Wein’s output using his time from release to response of 48 hours. Therefore, only
considering a 4 day response, Wein’s model as the basis for comparison, and considering
optimal pharmaceutical distribution, the costs associated with implementing “A Hot
Idea” do not return a positive net return. These scenario details however, would probably
not unfold in such a manner. At some time before the median incubation period, some
portion of personnel enrolled in “A Hot Idea” would present with an elevated temperature
and identify the need for further investigation.
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The term “symptom” is used to describe a condition reported by the patient. A
“sign” differs from a “symptom;” a sign is a physical finding made by a physician.
Although all 10 patients experienced the symptom of a fever, only 7 of the 10 patients
had signs of a fever above 37.8°C. This is an important distinction. Although the 2001
bioterrorism attacks are a small data set, if “A Hot Idea” was looking for temperatures
above 37.8°C, 30% of those infected would be missed. In this case, workforce personnel
should be told to report to the “workplace clinic” if they are feeling feverish regardless of
infrared temperature measurements.

Alternatively, considering the more realistic lower range of the incubation time of
1 day results in an expected morality of 84,300. The ranges cited by both USAMRIID
and the APHA are 1 - 6 and 1 - 7 days, respectively. This equates to a cost avoidance of
$99B. As was done for the BioWatch analysis above, this savings of $99B is true if an
anthrax attack is certain within the year being considered. This is not the case and is
difficult, if not impossible, to determine the likelihood of an attack.

If the attack probability is 1 in a 100 (or one attack in 100 years) or 1 in a 1000
(one attack in 1000 years), the costs averted in equation (2) would be multiplied by 0.01
or 0.001, respectively. Doing so results in “A Hot Idea” net return of $990M if the
probability of an anthrax attack is 0.01; net returns for a 0.001 probability event are
$99M. Considering a rental and O&M cost of $66.7M per year, “A Hot Idea” would
yield a negative net return after 15 years without an anthrax attack if the probability of
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attack is 0.01. A negative net return would result after two years if an attack whose
likelihood is 0.001 did not occur.

The early estimates of fever from USAMRIID and the APHA are 24 hours. This
time seems reasonable because a portion of a monitored workforce will be present with
fever in this early period of disease progression. If this time could be shortened even
further, the benefit of “A Hot Idea” would increase again. Assuming a 12 hour response
time due to the specificity garnered by developed individual temperature profiles is not
unreasonable. At 12 hours, the expected mortality is 77,100. Savings are $1.44B and
$144M for 0.01 and 0.001 probability events. Considering the same rental and O&M
cost, “A Hot Idea” yields negative net returns after 22 years and 3 years for 0.01 and
0.001 probability events.

Limitations of Data
Some issues with the quality of the data behind these economic numbers have
been mentioned previously (e.g. Sverdlovsk data reliability, small sample sizes, etc.).
Although tractable and well-referenced, the economic analysis is heavily dependent upon
Wein’s model and limitations of modeling must be considered. Although the difference
between a detection time of 6 hours and 48 hours was stated as “not markedly different,”
it can be argued otherwise. The difference between 70,000 deaths and 100,000 deaths is
30,000 deaths; this is still a magnitude of death averted that deserves significant
consideration and appreciation. The quantity, or availability, of data should also be
addressed. There is a lack of available data for a variety of reasons.
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BioWatch Data Limitations.
BioWatch surveillance is a sensitive subject; specific agents screened for,
locations of surveillance, and the scheduled time intervals between analysis of samples
are all closely-held information for obvious reasons. The cost to maintain and operate
BioWatch is also difficult to accurately quantify because budget numbers for biodefense
are not broken out by methodology but rather by the specific Departments of the federal
government that operate the methodologies. Within these departments, data is further
clouded by categorizing line items with vague headings. For example, The Department
of Homeland Security combines their budget numbers for BioWatch with the Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) initiatives and “other” research
efforts. The line item in their published budget data combines these efforts under
“Biological Countermeasures;” finding further breakdown is difficult.

“A Hot Idea” Data Limitations.
Data for “A Hot Idea” also presented a challenge to obtain. This methodology
has not been fielded to date and system set-up, maintenance, and operation costs have to
be estimated from similar, but still different technologies - like those used during the
2003 SARS season. One difference to consider is the high cost associated with the rental
of equipment and hiring of expertise to maintain and operate the thermal scanning units.
If “A Hot Idea” were to be implemented, a comparison would have to be made between
the cost to lease and the cost to purchase outright. Additionally, the costs quoted here
were during the SARS outbreak of 2003. Anytime technology is quickly implemented to
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address an urgent need, elevated costs will result. Competition and economies of scale
would bring thermal scanning units down on a cost/unit basis.

Morbidity Considerations
The discussion thus far has focused on the societal costs associated with
mortality. The illness rates, or the morbidity, associated with a similar scenario also
warrants discussion. For the base case used in Wein’s model, 1.49 million people will
become infected with the 1 kg anthrax release in climatic conditions described in his
paper. These infected people would require treatment and require services from the
medical apparatus of a city. This volume would quickly overwhelm the medical
apparatus. Output from Wein’s model agrees with this statement. Additionally, a
classified exercise run by the U.S. government in the fall of 2003 further confirmed this
(Wein, 2005). On top of this the “worried well” presenting to the medical facilities
would have to be dealt with. To satisfy the capacity that would be required by the
medical system, a 75-fold increase in facilities would have to be put into place for the
Wein scenario (Wein, 2003). This type of increase in care cannot be practically resolved
but must be addressed in response plans and planned for accordingly.

From an economical benefit-cost standpoint, morbidity costs are not expected to
have a major impact on the overall societal costs. Therefore, market-based values were
not assigned to quantify the effects of morbidity on society in this study. However, this
assumption of lower economic morbidity effects, should be investigated with further
research.
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Emerging Infectious Disease Considerations
The data presented here deals with one anthrax scenario. As discussed, many
variables could be altered creating a different result. The environmental conditions, the
timeliness of antibiotic distribution, and the efficacy of pharmaceuticals are just three
examples that, when changed, could produce significantly different effects and mortality
numbers. Additionally, if the incident were terrorist in nature, the technological
capabilities and intelligence of the attacker would influence the severity of the attack.
Keeping all the scenario variables constant, save one: the biological agent considered, has
the potential to change the outcome to an even greater extent.

The potential economic severity presented by a pandemic strain of avian influenza
virus was discussed earlier. An economic analysis was not conducted in this study due to
the scope of this work and the limited data available about a potential pandemic strain of
this virus that has not yet emerged. Follow-on research could explore this subject further.
Some considerations of surveillance for avian influenza and other emerging infectious
diseases are discussed in the analysis section of this work.
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Chapter 4 – Results and Analysis
Comparative Benefit – Cost Findings
While the data was difficult to obtain, a comparative economic benefit – cost
analysis was performed for a scenario involving anthrax. The anthrax scenario was
modeled by Lawrence Wein, et al.; and although peer reviewed, his work is still a model.
A model with a different construct, or with different assumptions, would have resulted in
a different output which could yield a different outcome in this effort. With these
limitations noted, the benefit-cost analysis yielded a societal savings of $84B in the event
of an anthrax attack behaving according to Wein’s model. Including the operation and
maintenance cost, and assuming a probability of such an attack at 0.001, BioWatch
represents a positive benefit-cost for 27 years. A time period greater than this, without an
anthrax attack but with BioWatch continuously operating is not economically justifiable.
The benefit-cost analysis for “A Hot Idea” with a 12-hour response time yielded a
societal savings of $144B in the scenario predicted by Wein’s model. Although this is a
greater cost averted, the cost of surveillance is also greater for “A Hot Idea.” The greater
operation and maintenance cost makes “A Hot Idea” economically justifiable for two
years assuming the same 0.001 probability of anthrax attack. Stated differently: a period
without an anthrax attack greater than two years would result in a benefit-cost figure less
than one and not be considered economically justifiable.
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Additional Considerations
Some of the differences in the two methodologies are not considered in this
analysis. The geographic area and the volume of air monitored by each methodology
were not considered. The vague numbers of samplers and lack of specific location
information in the BioWatch construct makes an accurate number difficult to tabulate.
Sampling units are deployed to cities with larger populations and greater likelihood of
receiving a malicious biological release. Specific detector locations are assumed to be
based upon predominant meteorological conditions. Shifting or abnormal weather
patterns may jeopardize optimal placement of the air sampling BioWatch units.
Additionally, microclimates are not always well-understood in urban environments;
strange air movement patterns exist between and around large high-rise buildings.
Optimal sampling locations in these atypical conditions are difficult to achieve all of the
time.

Sample Volume.
One way to compare the coverage provided by the two methodologies is to
consider the volume collected by each system. “A Hot Idea” will conduct surveillance on
½ of the commissioned workforce of New York City, or 32,916 city personnel. The
average person at rest consumes 6 liters of air per minute (L/min) (Fox, 2004). During
heavy exercise, this consumption rate can increase to 100 – 200 L/min (Fox, 2004).
Conservatively using the 6 L/min rate, each person will “sample” 360 liters of air per
hour, or 8640 liters per day. With the workforce of 32,916, that equates to 284,394,240
liters of air per day or 284.39 million liters of air per day. In the event of an emergency
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response, the rate of 6 L/min would significantly increase and thereby significantly
increase the overall sample volume collected. A high-volume air sampler, such as those
used with BioWatch, can collect between 700 and 1500 L of air/min (Kimoto-Electric
website, 2006). This equals a volume of 2.16 million liters of air per day per sampler.
Using the volume collected by “A Hot Idea” participating personnel equates to more than
131 high-volume samplers for New York City. BioWatch, on the other hand, has been
estimated to have 500 air samplers working in 31 cities (Kosal, 2003), or an average of
slightly over 16 air samplers per city. New York City is the largest city in the United
States. Assuming twice the average number of samplers exist in New York City would
equate to 32 air samplers. The volume collected by 32 high-volume air sampling units is
69.12 million liters of air per day. These volumes are shown graphically in Figure 12.

Volume Air Collected by Surveillance System
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Figure 12 - Volume Air Collected by Surveillance System. Assumes "A Hot Idea"
workforce of 32,916 and 32 BioWatch Samplers operating in New York City.

67

Some consideration should be made for this disparity in sampling volume. Using
the numbers above, “A Hot Idea” collects over four times the volume of air that
BioWatch does. If New York City had three times the average number of sampling units
compared to the other cities enrolled in BioWatch, the volume collected (103.68 million
liters/day) would still be less than half that collected by “A Hot Idea.”

Normalizing to reflect an equal volume of air sampled would require a workforce
approximately 25% the size used in the calculations above. “A Hot Idea” workforce of
8000 personnel consuming 6 L/min would sample approximately a same volume as 32
BioWatch units. The reduced workforce would require a proportionally smaller amount
of thermal scanners. The rental and O&M cost of 42 thermal scanning units is $1.4M and
$14.7M, respectively. Using these numbers a negative net return would result after nine
years if an attack whose likelihood is 0.001 did not occur. Table 6 shows the normalized
results compared to the “No Surveillance”, “BioWatch”, and “A Hot Idea” scenarios
described previously.
Table 6 - Time to Negative Net Return for Different Biosurveillance Methodologies if
Probablitly of Anthrax Attack is 0.001

Methodology

Capital
Cost

Annual O&M Cost

Neg. Net Return w/
0.001 event probability

No Surveillance

$0

$0

-

BioWatch
“A Hot Idea”

$2M
$5.8M

$3M
$60.9M

28 years
3 years

“A Hot Idea”
(equal vol sampled)

$1.4M

$14.7M

9 years
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“Design-To” Cost for “A Hot Idea”
Thus far, analysis has shown BioWatch to outperform “A Hot Idea” on the basis
of “time until negative net return”. Negative Net Return is dependent upon equation 3
above. The two components of equation 3 are the “Costs Averted” and the “Cost of
Surveillance”. “Costs averted” are similar between the methodologies but there is a vast
difference in the “Cost of Surveillance.” As stated previously, thermal scanner costs
quoted in this analysis were those seen during the SARS outbreak of 2003. Rental costs
from the 2003 actions were used because these financial figures were available in the
literature. The O&M cost came when the technology was rather new and in highdemand. These costs would be reduced with greater competition and economies of scale
if “A Hot Idea” were implemented in multiple cities. The extent of cost reduction
necessary to achieve the same negative net return time period as BioWatch was
determined.

Purchasing the thermal scanners, as opposed to renting them, is a realistic
decision that would likely occur with the fielding of a multiple city deployment of “A
Hot Idea”. A one-time capital cost of $1.4M would require an annual O&M cost of
$5.1M. These figures result in a negative net return at the same time as BioWatch.
These “design-to” figures are shown in the last row of Table 7.
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Table 7- "Design-To" Costs for "A Hot Idea" Resulting in Equal Time until Negative Net
Return. Note purchase price for thermal scanners replaces rental costs.

Methodology

Capital
Cost

Annual O&M Cost

Neg. Net Return w/
0.001 event probability

No Surveillance

$0

$0

-

BioWatch
“A Hot Idea”

$2M*
$5.8M**

$3M
$60.9M

28 years
3 years

“A Hot Idea”
(equal vol sampled)

$1.4M**

$14.7M

9 years

“A Hot Idea”
“Design-To”
calculation

$1.4M*

$5.1M

28 years
*One-time purchase price
** Annual rental price

Mobile and Stationary Samplers.
“A Hot Idea” samplers are mobile samplers while BioWatch’s are stationary. By
being mobile, a larger surface area of the city is covered. Participating personnel travel
inside buildings, on public transportation, and move throughout the day under, above and
on the pavement of the city. A larger variety of conditions are encountered by “A Hot
Idea” personnel. This was not considered in the economic analysis.

Anthrax versus Other Agents.
This comparison evaluates the different methodology’s performance in the
context of an anthrax attack. Neither of the respective surveillance technologies was
developed for the sole purpose of detecting the next anthrax attack. BioWatch is an
early-warning detection system looking for the presence of harmful biological agents in
the cities where the system is operating. A finite number of agents are looked for; the
exact number is unknown but can be confidently stated that agents other than anthrax are
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screened for. “A Hot Idea” also looks for more agents than just anthrax. In fact, it could
be said that “A Hot Idea” looks for many agents that have potential to infect large
portions of society. This is one of the stronger advantages to “A Hot Idea.”

“A Hot Idea” will theoretically find any agent that causes a statistically significant
portion of a participating workforce to result with an elevated temperature. In addition to
finding Category A agents such as anthrax, plague, and tularemia, “A Hot Idea” will
identify biological agents that cause “regular” public health problems such as seasonal
influenza. Finally, “A Hot Idea” will identify emerging infectious diseases that are new,
and perhaps even unknown, at their time of presentation. An avian influenza with the
capability of human-to-human transmission – not proven to exist at the time of this
writing – might be an example.

The ability to find any agent is based on the idea that an actual human being is
being used as the sensor to identify biological agents that will harm human beings. This
cyclical detection relationship is what allows detection of infectious agents that cause a
spike in temperature. Developing a collection technology as exquisite and accurate as the
human immune system is difficult, if not impossible.

Pathophysiology of Elevation in Temperature
“A Hot Idea” considers elevation in temperature as one of the initial signs after
the foreign agent enters the body. Disease progresses in stages starting with the
incubation period. The incubation period is defined as “the time from the moment of

71

inoculation (exposure) to the development of the clinical manifestations of a particular
infectious disease” (Pharma-Lexicon.com, 2006). The next stage or phase of disease is
called the prodromal period. The prodromal period is defined as “time during which a
disease process has begun but is not yet clinically manifest” (Pharma-Lexicon.com,
2006). The prodromal period is the short interval between the incubation period and
illness; the beginning appearance of symptoms (subjective) when the patient is getting
sick but without clinical signs (objective) being evident.

Following the prodromal

period is the period of illness, then the acme (the height of illness), decline, and finally
resolution (Abedon, 1998).

The first two stages of disease are those that “A Hot Idea” is concerned with; the
incubation and prodromal periods. Does the body respond by increasing temperature
before other clinical signs and symptoms are evident? If so, can “A Hot Idea” find this
temperature increase before the disease is clinically manifest?

The hypothalamus is the region of the brain that regulates temperature. In
addition to maintaining the normal, homeostatic temperature of the body, the
hypothalamus is also capable of raising the “set temperature.” When fighting an
infection, the body benefits from a elevation of temperature. A rise in temperature makes
the body less hospitable to bacteria. Additionally, increases in baseline temperature boost
immunity to viral agents by releasing interferons. Interferons are “a family of proteins
derived from human cells which normally has a role in fighting viral infections by
preventing virus multiplication in cells” (Pharma-Lexicon.com, 2006).
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To induce a rise in temperature, the hypothalamus increases the body’s baseline
temperature. The pathophysiology involves pyrogens (proteins) that start a cascade of
events that eventually raise the body’s baseline temperature and produce an elevation in
temperature and eventually, a fever. Generally there are two types of pyrogens:
exogenous and endogenous. Exogenous pyrogens come from foreign agents in the body,
notably microbial cells or toxins. Endogenous pyrogens are host cell-derived cytokines,
usually from macrophages. Cytokines are signaling molecules, similar to hormones
(Pharma-Lexicon.com, 2006).

The metabolites of exogenous pyrogens induce the

production of endogenous pyrogens. The process by which these pyrogenic cytokines
cause elevations in temperature is not completely understood. The cytokines may
interact with each other or with metabolites of cytokines, cross the blood-brain barrier to
reach the thermal regulating center of the hypothalamus region triggering another set of
events increasing one’s baseline temperature (Prewitt, 2005; Merck, 1999). This new
baseline temperature is maintained using the same negative feedback loops that maintain
a normal temperature in a healthy body.

Data Management and Individual Temperature Profiles
The data management piece to “A Hot Idea” is crucial to the success of this
methodology. Developing an accurate temperature profile for each participating
individual in the program is imperative to avoid confusing a rise in temperature with the
daily undulation expected due to circadian rhythm fluctuations.
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Defining the average body temperature as 37°C, an elevated temperature as
anything above 37°C, and a fever as > 38°C, is an incorrect assumption for “A Hot Idea”
purposes. First the numbers above are for an entire population, not an individual.
Second, standardized methods were not adhered to in the past: times of day, indoor
temperatures, ovulatory status, calibration of thermometers, and placement of the
temperature measuring devices were some variables that were not kept constant. With a
better knowledge of physiological mechanisms the body uses to regulate temperature, a
better understanding of hormone interaction and cellular metabolism, and having
calibration techniques for thermometers, a more accurate normal range can now be
defined. Individual temperature profiles with greater specificity will be developed using
controlled methodology to use with “A Hot Idea.”

Body temperatures vary both within a particular individual and within the general
population. In an individual, the temperature variation is due to circadian rhythm, and is
about 0.6°C (1°F) (Merck, 1999). The nadir, or low point is 6 AM and the zenith, or
high point, is between 4 and 6 PM (Mackowiak, 1992). A study looking at adults aged
19 to 59 years reported an average ear temperature range of 35.0°C to 37.8°C (SundLevander, 2004). Mackowiak’s work found 36.8°C as the mean oral temperature of
subjects, higher temperatures for women than men, and a trend of higher temperatures in
African-Americans than in Caucasians (Mackowiak, 1992). Body temperature is also
dependant upon the ovulatory cycle in women; when ovulating, body temperatures
increases by ~0.3°C (Craig Medical Distribution, 2006). Post-menopausal women have
lower temperatures than menstruating women; more similar to the men’s range (Sund-
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Levander, 2004). These results are all normalized to reflect the range of temperature to
the average person in the average environment. Altering the individual’s physical
environment will provide further variation to the normal range.

One’s physical state of health has to be considered. The state of health should be
considered in two ways – versus the general populace and versus the normal state of
physical health for that individual. First, compared to the populace, those with lower
body mass indices have less fat to insulate the body with and therefore have lower normal
temperatures. Similarly, because women generally have a larger amount of subcutaneous
fat than men, this is one mechanism that contributes to women having higher
temperatures than men. Lower resting heart rates and higher metabolic levels will also
affect temperature levels. Addressing the second consideration, a person’s current state
of health compared to their normal state of health, an individual’s body temperature
fluctuates with the level of exercise, stress, and hydration (DiscoveryMedical.com, 2005).
Temperatures fluctuate due to metabolic activity and therefore the diet of individuals
should be considered (e.g. an individual’s temperature will vary depending upon when a
meal was eaten last - 30 minutes ago or 5 hours ago). Variables affecting the
temperature are numerous. A well-thought out data management system will be needed
to resolve these issues.

Individual temperature profiles will need to be developed for each participant in
“A Hot Idea.” A “baselining” period of some time (e.g. 6 to 12 months) will be needed
to create a unique temperature profile with statistical merit. This baselining period may
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have to be longer for women in the program as they normally experience a greater
amount of variation in their temperatures due to ovulatory cycles.

Ease of use for the participants of “A Hot Idea” should also be considered when
designing the data management and collection process. Thermal scanners have
advertised needing a measurement time of 3 seconds to accurately record and report
temperatures. A “user-friendly” procedure is crucial to gain acceptance of the new
surveillance methodology.

Does diurnal variation occur in the presence of fever? During a 24 hour period,
temperature varies from lowest levels in the early morning to the highest levels in the late
afternoon. Overall however, there is a lack of temperature measurement data conducted
in a standardized manner. Individual temperature profile data collection and management
is addressed again in the follow-on research section of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5 - Discussion
This research effort compared different biosurveillance methodologies using a
benefit – cost deterministic model. A currently fielded air sampling system, BioWatch,
was compared and contrasted to a thermo-detection methodology called “A Hot Idea.”
A “do-nothing” approach was also considered. Available information regarding the
methodologies was limited and therefore, there was a lack of concrete data to analyze
with the benefit – cost approach. However, several observations, considerations, and
further research areas were identified.

Biopreparedness initiatives are a complicated and complex issue. The scientific
and rational answer may not be implemented due to political pressures and public
understanding of the issues at hand. Some studies have concluded that, in the case of
anthrax, pre-event vaccination efforts are the most important initiative (Wein, 2005).
Others have cited rapid pharmaceutical distribution after an attack as the critical effort to
avert societal impact from a biological release (Kaufmann, 1997). This research did not
focus on either of these ideas. In reality, a combination of systems will be implemented
to address the need for readiness against harmful biological agents. One of these systems
is biosurveillance. BioWatch is currently operating in 31 cities across the country. “A
Hot Idea” is another surveillance methodology that should be considered further. The
political backlash associated with a “do-nothing” approach makes this option unlikely.
Allocating resources from biosurveillance to other initiatives such as a vaccination or
antibiotic distribution program could be considered but was not undertaken here.
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Modeling with one biological agent and one set of environmental conditions,
BioWatch was found to be more economically beneficial than “A Hot Idea.”

With a

likelihood of anthrax attack set at 0.001, BioWatch returned a positive benefit – cost ratio
for 27 years while “A Hot Idea” returned a positive benefit – cost ratio for three years.

Comment on these results should be made. “A Hot Idea” collects multiple
volumes of air more than that collected by the high-volume samplers used in BioWatch.
When adjusted to an equal volume of air, “A Hot Idea” returned a positive benefit – cost
ratio for eight years. The sampling personnel for “A Hot Idea” are mobile and cover a
lager area of a city including outdoor and indoor environments. Sampling a larger
volume and covering a larger surface area provides a more thorough surveillance of a city
for harmful biological agents. BioWatch screens for a limited number of agents where
“A Hot Idea” looks for any and all agents that will cause an elevation in temperature.
The “any and all” includes both presently existing microbes and unknown organisms that
may emerge in the future.

The potential capabilities of “A Hot Idea” are enormous. If the enabling
technologies can be developed supporting the “A Hot Idea” methodology, “A Hot Idea”
is the better of the two choices. The enabling technologies need to be fleshed out and
their feasibility determined. The data management of individual temperature profiles will
need to be specific enough to recognize small incremental deviations from the person’s
average temperature taking into account metabolic fluctuations and different activity

78

levels. Better pathophysiological understanding of the earliest time in the elevation in
temperature needs to be determined - long before a defined fever of 38°C is reached.
Understanding of the mechanisms at work during the initial generation of pyrogens is
crucial. If pyrogens are not created or do not interact with the hypothalamus during the
incubation period and only begin during the short prodromic period, a fever mechanism
will not be triggered and therefore, will not be picked up by “A Hot Idea” regardless of
the specificity within individual temperature profiles.

An advantage of “A Hot Idea” is the ability to detect a great number of today’s
present biological agents and tomorrow’s emerging infectious agents. The cornerstone of
this is the temperature increase in the human body. Anthrax, plague, tularemia, and
smallpox all have prodromic fevers; Venezuelan equine encephalitis and Q-fever have
fever associated with the illness period (USAMRIID, 2004). Individuals infected with
brucellosis experience an undulating fever. An individual exposed to malaria on the
other hand, may not present with a fever for months. Arguably malaria isn’t generally
considered a biowarfare agent of concern but the issue is with the body’s different
response to different agents. An emerging infectious disease that does not produce an
early fever would be problematic to “A Hot Idea.” BioWatch would also have problems
with an emerging infectious disease but for different reasons; because BioWatch is only
looking for a list of expected agents.

Finally, the capability of physicians and medical laboratories to be able to identify
any agent infecting the human body needs further exploration. The differential diagnosis
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by today’s physicians does not include emerging infectious diseases that have not been
previously identified. The outbreak of hantavirus in the four corners region of the
United States in 1993 was not recognized for almost a month (Zubay, 2005). The time to
arrive at the correct diagnosis should be studied to accurately estimate the time until
response activities are initiated.

Follow-on Research
Disregarding the limitations due to available data, several limitations and
unknowns were discovered for each respective biosurveillance methodology. These
limitations could be researched in follow-on studies.

Morbidity Study.
With more solid data, follow-on research efforts could focus on the morbidity
aspect of a biological release. Viscusi’s Value of Statistical Life (VSL) figure of $6.3M
is considered the standard for policy decisions today. Using this value to compute
societal costs for mortality is well founded. Finding a similarly accepted figure or
methodology to calculate morbidity costs is more difficult. Without a thorough effort to
define well-founded economic values for morbidity, quantifying societal costs would
only add more uncertainty and therefore was not undertaken during this study. Follow-on
research efforts could look into the impact morbidity plays on society cost. Patients
could be classified into three categories: in-patient hospitalizations, out-patient hospital
visits, and those not seeking medical care. The groups could then be further divided into
age groups: 0-19, 20-64, and over 65 years to further delineate the impact missed time
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from work and family would have on the society. These costs could then be added to the
mortality piece that was completed in this paper for an overall, morbidity and mortality
cost to society.

Individual Temperature Profiles.
The general concept behind “A Hot Idea” is attractive at first glance. Unknowns
that need to be resolved to discern the full potential of the idea are many. Can the
sensitivity of current temperature measuring devices be reduced to flag the first sign of
infection? Temperature measurement is done today in terms of distinguishing a fever
from a non-fever. This thought process will need to be changed with “A Hot Idea” into
one that looks for the earliest rise in temperature due to the presence of a pathogen.
Today’s temperature measurements are interpreted using the variation of the general
population. Doing so introduces the standard deviation for the general population which
includes a wide variety of variables. Different genders, ethnic backgrounds, ages, states
of health, and environments are all covered by the accepted average and febrile
temperatures of 37°C and 38°C, respectively. These are only a few of the examples that
affect temperature variation in a population. For “A Hot Idea” to effectively work,
individual temperature profiles will have to be built for each worker participating in the
program. How much does intra-species temperatures vary from day to day? How much
does an individual’s level of activity affect their individual temperature profile? Limited
studies were found in the literature regarding studies of intra-species temperature
variation. Those studies that were found had a low number of subjects (Wouter, 2002).
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A follow-on research effort could establish individual temperature profiles and
determine the standard deviation observed intra-species. If conducted with personnel
attending the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) in Dayton, Ohio, a rather
stratified population would be evaluated. Personnel enrolled at AFIT are required to
meet certain physical fitness standards and are generally at an age that would be
representative of the workforce that would be monitored with “A Hot Idea” methodology.
Details preceding the measurement of temperature could be recorded. Examples could
include: level of activity individual was involved with, time since last meal, contents of
the last meal, and environmental temperatures and conditions the individual recently
worked in.

The initial concept of “A Hot Idea” involved the monitoring of pre- and postworkshift temperatures. One requirement is to minimize the standard variation of the
individual being monitored so that the earliest onset of illness can be recognized.
Individual temperature profiles are one solution to achieve this, but at the same time, the
variables that individuals undergo each day may introduce a larger day-to-day
temperature variation than desired. If the variation is found to be too great due to
changing everyday conditions (e.g. outside temperature, level of exertion at work, details
with diet, etc.), “A Hot Idea” might sacrifice some detection time to tighten the standard
deviation seen in individual profiles. Temperatures could be collected only once per day.
They would be taken initially in the morning before workshifts begin, just after rest has
concluded, and when the body is closest to its true state of homeostasis. This would
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eliminate some of the variables influencing temperature introducing large amounts of
standard variation into the measurements.

Pyrogen Physiology.
Related to the study of individual temperature profiles, the presence and
interaction of pyrogens could be looked at further. Using the blood of horseshoe crabs,
Limulus amoebocyte lysate assays have been developed to ensure the absence of
endospores (which are a form of pyrogens) in sterile environments. More medically
related in research, valuable information pertaining to the onset of fever and the
cornerstone of “A Hot Idea” could be obtained.

Radio-Frequency Identification.
Data management systems will have to be developed to efficiently handle the
large amounts of data. Streamlining the process to the most “user-friendly” configuration
will help with acceptance of the methodology. Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)
technology should be explored to assist with this. The potential for RFID is just being
realized. One example could include coding data onto grain-sized media for
identification purposes. This is the same technology used to identify consumers with
ExxonMobil’s SpeedPass system at fueling stations (Technovelgy.com, 2006). Easy
identification of “A Hot Idea” personnel could be enabled when checking in and out from
the work environment with RFID. Next-generation RFID could have even greater
implications on “A Hot Idea”: a RFID device could be inserted into individuals to track
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their temperatures. Real-time temperature data would eliminate the use of thermal
scanners and provide enormous amount of data to monitor for anomalies.

Conclusion
Providing surveillance for harmful biological material is a complex and difficult
task. No panacea exists satisfying all requirements and a combination of initiatives is
required to maximize biological readiness. The two methodologies looked at in this
paper each have separate strengths, limitations, and challenges. The currently operational
BioWatch is providing some level of protection today. Past operating procedures in the
event of a positive response, unknown background biological agent concentrations, and a
limited list of agents screened for are challenges to the system. Conversely, while not yet
fielded, the proof-of-concept behind “A Hot Idea” is attractive but needs further research
to determine the practicality of overcoming the challenges mentioned in this paper.
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